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MAPPING A HIDDEN WORLD OF 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY 
COOPERATION 
JEFFREY L. DUNOFF* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Almost exactly one decade ago, Law and Contemporary Problems published 
a highly influential symposium entitled The Emergence of Global 
Administrative Law.1 The articles in that issue described rapidly changing 
patterns of transnational regulation, identified an emerging “global 
administrative space,” and explored normative questions raised by shifts in 
authority to transnational administrative processes. At roughly the same time, 
network scholars described a “new world order,” in which transnational 
governance networks increasingly conducted regulatory functions across a wide 
variety of issue areas.2 Both literatures introduced new conceptualizations of 
trends in international cooperation and standard-setting. 
This symposium’s focus on “international regulatory cooperation” revisits 
themes explored in the global administrative law and networks literatures. 
Broadly conceived, international regulatory cooperation consists of 
arrangements to promote cooperation in the design, monitoring, and 
enforcement or ex post management of regulation, with a view to supporting 
the consistency of rules across national borders. The topic has returned to the 
center of the diplomatic and scholarly agenda, in part as a result of the 
regulatory failures that contributed to the global recession. Indeed, as this 
symposium goes to press, the European Union (EU) and the United States are 
engaged in EU–U.S. Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
negotiations, which are focused on promoting regulatory coherence,3 and a 
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 1.  Symposium, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 & 
4 (Summer & Autumn 2005).  
 2.  See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004).  
 3.  C. Boyden Gray, Upgrading Existing Regulatory Mechanisms for Transatlantic Regulatory 
Cooperation, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2015; Fernanda G. Nicola, The Politicization of Legal 
Expertise in the TTIP Negotiation, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4,  2015. For a provocative view of 
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lively debate has emerged over how best to implement an executive order 
promoting international regulatory cooperation.4 Thus, this symposium could 
not be more timely. 
The contributions to this symposium substantially advance scholarly 
understanding of the strategies governments use to promote more consistent 
and coordinated rules. Notably, although the articles diverge on a number of 
critical issues, they share a common understanding of the phenomena under 
investigation. International regulatory cooperation, under this shared view, 
involves domestic officials from different jurisdictions jointly addressing issues 
of mutual concern. This activity is characterized as international because it 
involves activities between or among officials from different states. 
Despite the important insights found in these articles, the focus on 
interactions among domestic regulators from different jurisdictions has the 
unintended and unfortunate effect of obscuring other important forms of 
international regulatory cooperation, including, specifically, regulatory 
interactions among actors from different international organizations and legal 
regimes. These activities, analyzed in more detail below, are “regulatory” in the 
sense that they involve sustained and organized efforts to modify the behavior 
of target actors to advance social or collective ends, through rules or norms and, 
often, mechanisms of implementation and enforcement. Moreover, these 
regulatory activities result from “interactions,” meaning they are a product of 
the myriad ways that international actors and institutions engage with and react 
to one another. 
To be sure, international organizations also interact with firms, 
nongovernmental organizations, and other civil society actors in ways that 
produce novel and important forms of regulation. However, in recent years, a 
large and sophisticated literature has analyzed both hybrid public–private 
bodies and private transnational regulation.5 Ironically, the same amount of 
scholarly attention has not been devoted to regulation resulting from 
interactions involving more familiar international actors, namely international 
 
the potential costs of regulatory cooperation and the potential benefits of regulatory variation, see 
Jonathan B. Wiener & Alberto Alemanno, The Future of International Regulatory Cooperation: TTIP 
as a Learning Process toward a Global Policy Laboratory, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2015, at 
122–32. 
 4.  Exec. Order No. 13,609, 77 Fed. Reg. 26,413 (May 1, 2012). See, e.g., Reeve T. Bull, 
Developing a Domestic Framework for International Regulatory Cooperation, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., no. 4, 2015. 
 5.  See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS ORCHESTRATORS (Kenneth Abbott et al. 
eds., 2015); TIM BÜTHE & WALTER MATTLI, THE NEW GLOBAL RULERS: THE PRIVATIZATION OF 
REGULATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (2011); Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Private Regulatory 
Governance: Ambiguities of Public Authority and Private Power, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 117 
(2013). Indeed, as private and hybrid public–private regulatory efforts proliferate, scholars have even 
begun to analyze their interactions with each other. See, e.g., Burkard Eberlein et al., Transnational 
Business Governance Interactions: Conceptualization and Framework for Analysis, 8 REG. & 
GOVERNANCE (SPECIAL ISSUE: TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS GOVERNANCE INTERACTIONS) 1 (2014) 
(analyzing implications of interactions in transnational business governance across numerous issue 
areas for regulatory capacity and performance).  
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organizations. The inattention to international regulatory cooperation, however, 
is particularly significant for several reasons. 
First, international regulatory cooperation is commonly used to address a 
wide variety of issues. In areas as disparate as peacekeeping, fighting 
HIV/AIDS, monitoring trade in dangerous chemicals, offering debt relief, 
protecting endangered species, coordinating international criminal 
enforcement, and providing humanitarian assistance, actors from different 
international organizations and regimes routinely collaborate to jointly address 
issues of common concern.6 As a result, the failure to attend to this activity 
compromises dominant approaches to conceptualizing international regulatory 
cooperation. Conversely, attention to the variety, number, and importance of 
these forms of coordination, collaboration, and, at times, competition among 
international bodies is essential to understanding the promise and limits of 
international regulatory cooperation. 
Second, the quantity and significance of these forms of international 
regulatory cooperation will increase, as traditional forms of cooperation—
prominently including efforts to create general rules via multilateral treaty—are 
seen as increasingly cumbersome and ineffective.7 The rapid rise of new powers 
has rendered multilateral negotiations more difficult. Moreover, existing 
international bodies—frequently designed in light of very different distributions 
of power—are often paralyzed by dysfunctional but difficult-to-change 
decisionmaking processes.8 Together, these difficulties contribute to a growing 
sense that traditional legislative and regulatory mechanisms are unable to meet 
current needs.9 As a result, new forms of multi-stakeholder and nontreaty 
governance are emerging. The impact and reach of the nontraditional 
mechanisms highlighted here will only increase over time. 
Third, the emergence of new forms of international regulatory cooperation 
raises challenging conceptual, doctrinal, and normative issues. As an analytic 
matter, what are the drivers, mechanisms, and pathways that determine the 
frequency and intensity of regulatory interactions? Under what circumstances 
are interactions likely to lead to cooperative behavior, and when do they lead to 
competition? How should we characterize, measure, and evaluate the outputs 
and impacts of regulatory interactions? As a doctrinal matter, what rules govern 
the production of legal norms through interactions among actors from different 
international bodies? Are these activities subject to judicial review or to other 
institutional checks and balances? Finally, as a normative matter, in what sense 
 
 6.  See infra Part III.  
 7. See, e.g., THOMAS HALE, DAVID HELD & KEVIN YOUNG, GRIDLOCK: WHY GLOBAL 
COOPERATION IS FAILING WHEN WE NEED IT MOST (2013) (arguing that treaties and other forms of 
legal cooperation are increasingly inadequate).  
 8.  See, e.g., Shawn Donnan, WTO Begins Talks to Break Deadlock Over ‘Consensus’ Principle, 
FINANCIAL TIMES, Oct. 12, 2014, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a289ba90-51e7-11e4-b55e-
00144feab7de.html#axzz3SgXZoD00 (detailing efforts to circumvent the founding principle that all 
decisions are made by consensus in light of ongoing negotiation deadlock).  
 9.  HALE, HELD & YOUNG, supra note 7.  
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are norms produced by international bureaucrats legitimate? To whom are 
actors in different international organizations accountable? What role do power 
and inequality play in determining whether and how international regulatory 
cooperation takes place?10 
Fourth, international regulatory cooperation has not been systematically 
explored in the scholarly literature.11 For example, although network theorists 
have illuminated the informal arrangements created when regulatory officials 
cooperate with counterparts in other jurisdictions, to date, they have not 
addressed the network-style interactions that take place among officials from 
different international bodies.12 Although some global administrative law 
writings usefully address interactions among international organizations,13 this 
literature rarely, if ever, foregrounds the dynamic, ongoing, relational 
regulatory interactions detailed below. And, although the literature on regime 
complexes helpfully describes the institutionally dense environment within 
which international organizations exist,14 it has not developed an analytic 
typology to clarify the various types of interactions that take place. As a result, 
scholars know little about these actions and their role in contemporary global 
governance. 
This article seeks to extend the existing literature, provide greater analytical 
traction to the study of international regulatory cooperation than existing 
approaches do, and advance understandings of how, why, and when 
international regulatory cooperation occurs. To do so, this article maps the 
various ways international organizations cooperate, collaborate, and at times, 
compete in the design, interpretation, and implementation of international 
rules, regulations, standards, and guidelines. The analysis proceeds in three 
parts, followed by a brief conclusion. 
 
 10.  Of course, similar questions can be asked of the transnational regulatory efforts explored 
elsewhere in this issue. However, these questions are even more pressing regarding the forms of 
cooperation highlighted here. The actors and institutions in the processes described below lack the legal 
and political controls that apply to parallel domestic processes, and the norms they produce lack the 
foundation in state consent that more traditional forms of international regulatory cooperation possess. 
 11.  Rare exceptions that adopt broader perspectives on interactions among international bodies 
similar to those developed here include INSTITUTIONAL INTERACTION IN GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
GOVERNANCE: SYNERGY AND CONFLICT AMONG INTERNATIONAL AND EU POLICIES (Sebastian 
Oberthür & Thomas Gehring eds., 2006); MARGARET A. YOUNG, TRADING FISH, SAVING FISH: THE 
INTERACTION BETWEEN REGIMES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2011); Claire R. Kelly, Institutional 
Alliances and Derivative Legitimacy, 29 MICH. J. INT’L L. 605 (2008).  
 12.  Abraham L. Newman & David Zaring, Regulatory Networks: Power, Legitimacy, and 
Compliance, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART 244 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds., 2013) (reviewing 
scholarship on regulatory networks).  
 13.  See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart & Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin, The World Trade 
Organization and Global Administrative Law, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, MULTILEVEL TRADE 
GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 457 (Christian Joerges & Ernst-Ulrich 
Petersmann eds., 2011).  
 14.  See, e.g., Kal Raustiala, Institutional Proliferation and the International Legal Order, in 
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: 
THE STATE OF THE ART 293 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds., 2013). 
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Part II provides a very short overview of the structural factors that give rise 
to interactions among international organizations. The article briefly describes a 
decentralized and fragmented international order consisting of multiple 
international legal regimes with functional, and at times overlapping, 
responsibilities. This material will be familiar to many readers, but it provides a 
necessary background and context for the analysis that follows. 
Part III, the heart of the article, develops a preliminary typology of the 
various ways actors from different international organizations engage in 
regulatory cooperation. In particular, the article identifies two different axes to 
categorize these interactions. One axis focuses on the various forms interactions 
can take, which centers on the activity or function being coordinated. The 
second axis focuses on the nature of the interaction, which spans a continuum 
from rationalization of parallel or overlapping efforts, to expansions of powers 
or jurisdiction, to competitive and conflictual interactions. Considered together, 
these axes can be conceptualized as a three-by-three matrix that captures much 
of the universe of international regulatory cooperation. 
The purpose of illuminating and mapping this world of international 
regulatory cooperation is not simply to clarify systematically the different 
modes of interaction. Just as importantly, it is intended to open up a fruitful 
new research agenda for those who wish to understand and critique this activity. 
Thus, part IV, identifies some of the positive and normative issues raised by 
international regulatory cooperation. As a positive matter, future studies can do 
much to identify patterns in international organization interactions, including 
the factors that contribute to successful or unsuccessful international regulatory 
outcomes and whether they differ across different issue areas. Future research 
should also explore normative concerns raised by international regulatory 
cooperation, including issues of accountability and legitimacy, as well as the role 
of power in shaping the frequency and content of international regulatory 
cooperation. 
II 
STRUCTURAL FACTORS BEHIND INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY 
COOPERATION: INSTITUTIONAL PROLIFERATION AND OVERLAP 
International regulatory cooperation takes place within the context of an 
international legal order that took shape during the remarkable period of 
treaty-drafting and institution-building following the end of World War II. 
These postwar efforts clustered, broadly, around three different domains—
security and warfare, human rights, and international economic relations. In the 
area of security and armed conflict, states created the United Nations in the 
summer of 1945,15 crystallizing in law the modern rules governing the use of 
force and, shortly thereafter, the four Geneva Conventions on the law of armed 
conflict.16 The UN Charter’s skeletal human rights provisions17 marked the start 
 
 15.  See U.N. Charter.  
 16.  Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
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of what has evolved into an institutionally dense human rights system. In 1948, 
the UN General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights,18 which in turn led to the covenants on civil and political rights and on 
economic and social rights; a series of regional human rights agreements; and 
treaties addressing specific human rights concerns such as genocide, torture, 
and gender discrimination.19 Developments in the economic field were equally 
substantial: the 1944 Bretton Woods Agreements created the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund. In 1948, an agreement was reached on the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the precursor to today’s 
World Trade Organization (WTO), which oversees some $23 trillion in 
international trade in goods and services per year. 
As this thumbnail account suggests, during the postwar era, international 
cooperation has increasingly been structured within the framework of 
international organizations. Today, hundreds of these bodies—
intergovernmental entities established by treaty and governed by international 
law—populate the international landscape, addressing aviation, commerce, 
culture, development, environment, intellectual property, investment, oceans, 
trade, and virtually every other field of human endeavor. This institutional 
order can claim many important successes. Although the UN obviously has not 
eliminated global conflict, it has facilitated the settlement of many regional 
conflicts, played a central role in the decolonization process, and greatly 
elevated the prominence of human rights in international legal and political 
discourse. The GATT−WTO and Bretton Woods institutions spearheaded an 
enormous expansion of the global economy that helped to lift millions out of 
poverty; the World Health Organization (WHO) was instrumental in virtually 
eliminating polio and smallpox and reducing infant mortality; and the Office of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has assisted 
over thirty million refugees fleeing war, persecution, and famine. Additionally, 
technically oriented bodies, like the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), help make 
the conveniences of modern life possible. Overall, it is fair to conclude that 
“these special-purpose global bodies . . . make vast contributions to aggregate 
 
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of 
the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 
6 U.S.T. 3217; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3316; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516.  
 17.  See U.N. Charter pmbl. (recognizing “fundamental human rights” and the “dignity and worth 
of the human person”); id. at art. 1, para. 3 (declaring one of the purposes of the charter is to 
“promot[e] and encourag[e] respect for human rights”). 
 18.  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc A/RES/217(III) 
(Dec. 10, 1948).  
 19.  See, e.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Dec. 10 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. 
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human welfare and promote important moral concerns in fields such as human 
rights and environmental protection.”20 
At the same time, the proliferation of organizations is potentially 
problematic. International organizations and regimes are typically created in 
response to specific problems and hence have been formed at different times by 
different actors for different purposes. Thus, each international organization 
comes with its own constitutive text, legal rules and principles, subsidiary 
bodies, and expertise, all designed to pursue specific tasks and advance certain 
values. These bodies operate in a highly decentralized and largely 
nonhierarchical environment. Activities and decisions in one regime are often 
taken with little knowledge of or regard for decisions in neighboring regimes, 
and there are few formal rules to govern their relations or mechanisms to 
promote accountability or coordination. 
To be sure, many domestic legal systems contain large numbers of 
specialized administrative and regulatory bodies. These bodies, however, are 
typically subject to compulsory judicial review as well as legislative and 
executive oversight that can prioritize objectives, coordinate activities, and 
resolve conflicts. These authorities and mechanisms are largely lacking on the 
global level.21 
In the highly fragmented international legal order, two or more 
international bodies or legal regimes frequently purport to govern the same 
individuals, activities, or policy domains. For example, at least a half-dozen 
international bodies currently address international financial issues, no less than 
ten international bodies claim regulatory authority over Internet infrastructure, 
and roughly two dozen international bodies address climate change.22 Moreover, 
although recourse to courts is still considerably less common on the 
international plane than the domestic, the proliferation of international 
tribunals means it is increasingly possible for the same dispute to be considered 
by multiple courts that use different procedures and apply different law. In this 
densely populated international legal landscape, global and regional regulatory 
bodies continuously interact in complex patterns of regulatory cooperation and 
competition. 
III 
A TYPOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COOPERATION 
This part begins the task of mapping the complex terrain of international 
regulatory cooperation. For expository purposes it is useful to distinguish 
between two different axes. One highlights the form of the interaction, focusing 
 
 20.  Richard B. Stewart, Remedying Disregard in Global Regulatory Governance: Accountability, 
Participation, and Responsiveness, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 211, 214 (2014). 
 21.  Id. at 218. 
 22.  See Vint Cerf et al., Internet Governance is Our Shared Responsibility, 10 J. L. & POL’Y INFO. 
SOC. 1 (2014) (discussing the international efforts to regulate the internet); Robert O. Keohane & 
David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Climate Change, 9 PERSP. ON POL. 7 (2011) (describing the 
international regulatory regime for global climate change efforts).  
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on the activity or function being coordinated. A second axis highlights the 
nature of the interaction, which covers a continuum from rationalization of 
overlapping efforts, to expansions of jurisdiction, to competitive and conflictual 
interactions. This is by no means intended as an exhaustive list or the only way 
to conceptualize the interactions resulting in regulatory cooperation. Nor 
should the categories be understood as mutually exclusive, as interactions often 
migrate from one form to another (that is, operational interactions produce 
regulatory interactions) or reflect mixed motives (because international 
organizations often simultaneously cooperate and compete). The categories are 
a useful heuristic device to organize a wide array of international practice and 
help render visible the under-studied phenomena of global regulatory 
cooperation. 
A. Forms of International Regulatory Cooperation 
Many interactions produce new regulatory norms and instruments. 
Sometimes, actors from different international organizations interact with the 
express intention of generating new standards; this article labels these 
“regulatory interactions.” Other times, actors from multiple bodies interact on 
operational issues, with new regulatory norms as an incidental byproduct of 
these “operational interactions.” And sometimes, actors from different bodies 
engage in “conceptual interactions,” which are not themselves intended directly 
to produce regulatory outcomes but instead to lay the analytic and conceptual 
underpinnings for future regulatory efforts. 
1. Regulatory Interactions: Creating and Navigating Shared Regulatory 
Space 
Across a wide variety of policy domains, actors from multiple international 
bodies systematically interact with each other to navigate or create shared 
regulatory space. In so doing, they regularly and continuously generate new 
international legal rules, regulations, standards, and guidelines. 
a. Interactions to address coordination problems. Perhaps the most common 
and most straightforward form of international regulatory cooperation occurs 
when two or more international bodies jointly produce legal norms and other 
regulatory instruments. This is a particularly attractive means to solve 
coordination problems, such as when mutual gains are available when parties 
coalesce around common positions. 
Consider, for example, international efforts to control environmentally 
hazardous substances and activities. In the 1980s and 1990s, a number of 
uncoordinated efforts to classify and label dangerous chemicals emerged, 
including an International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention, an 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
Chemicals Programme, a Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
recommendation on pesticides, UN recommendations, and various EU 
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directives.23 This fragmented approach proved unsatisfactory and, in 1992, states 
formally recognized the need for “a globally harmonized hazard classification 
system and compatible labelling system.”24 To advance this goal, in 1995, the 
WHO, the OECD, the FAO, the ILO, the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP), and the United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization (UNIDO) jointly formed the Inter-Organization for the Sound 
Management of Chemicals (IOMC).25 Among other responsibilities, the IOMC 
was charged with developing a harmonized classification and labelling system.26 
To do so, different tasks were allocated to different agencies. For example, the 
IOMC designated the OECD as the lead agency for the harmonization of 
classification criteria for health and environmental hazards, a UN Sub-
Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods served as the 
focal point for work on physical hazards, and the ILO managed work on the 
harmonization of chemical-hazard communication. An IOMC coordinating and 
drafting group, including members of all IOMC agencies, oversaw these various 
efforts. Once the IOMC group combined and harmonized the various efforts 
into one comprehensive document, it was submitted to the UN for global 
implementation as the “Globally Harmonized System for the Classification and 
Labelling of Chemicals” (GHS). The GHS was first published in 2003, with 
revisions in 2005 and 2007.27  Although the GHS is extremely ambitious—it 
covers all chemicals—it has been implemented, in whole or in part, by 
approximately sixty-seven states, including the United States and the EU.28 
 
 23.  See, e.g., ILO, Convention Concerning Safety in the Use of Chemicals at Work, No. C170 
(June 25, 1990); OECD, Decision-Recommendation of the Council on the Systematic Investigation of 
Existing Chemicals, C(87)90/Final (June 26, 1987); FAO, Revised Guidelines on Environmental Criteria 
for the Registration of Pesticides (1989); European Econ. Cmty., On the Evaluation and Control of the 
Risks of Existing Substances, Council Regulation No. 793/93, Off. J. Eur. Comm. L. 84 (Mar. 23, 1993). 
 24.  UN Conference on Environment & Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 3–14, 1992, 
Agenda 21, ¶ 19.27. 
 25.  FAO-ILO-OECD-UNEP-UNIDO-WHO: Memorandum of Understanding Concerning 
Establishment of the Inter-Organization Programme for the Sound Management of Chemicals, Mar. 
13, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1311.  
 26.  IOMC, Coordinating Group for the Harmonization of Chemical Classification Systems, Revised 
Terms of Reference and Work Program, at Annex 1, ¶¶ 7–8, Doc. IOMC/HCS/95 (Jan. 14, 1996).  
 27.  U.N. ECON. COMM’N FOR EUR. GLOBALLY HARMONIZED SYSTEM OF CLASSIFICATION AND 
LABELLING OF CHEMICALS, U.N. Doc. ST/SG/AC.10/30, U.N. Sales No. E.03.II.E.25 (Aug. 2003); 
U.N. ECON. COMM’N FOR EUR. GLOBALLY HARMONIZED SYSTEM OF CLASSIFICATION AND 
LABELLING OF CHEMICALS (GHS), U.N. Doc. ST/SG/AC.10/30/Rev.4, U.N. Sales No. E.11.II.E.6 
(2011); U.N. ECON. COMM’N FOR EUR. GLOBALLY HARMONIZED SYSTEM OF CLASSIFICATION AND 
LABELLING OF CHEMICALS (GHS) U.N. Doc. ST/SG/AC.10/30/Rev.5, U.N. Sales No. E.13.II.E.1 
(2013). 
 28.  In February 2006, IMOC, UNEP, and the Intergovernmental Forum on Chemical Safety 
(IFCS) convened the International Conference on Chemicals Management. The Global Environment 
Facility, the United Nations Development Programme, and the World Bank joined the coconvenors in 
adopting a Strategic Approach to International Chemicals management (SAICM). This initiative is 
designed to “strengthen the coherence and [the] synergies that exist” between existing efforts to 
manage dangerous chemicals and to address “existing gaps in the framework of international chemicals 
policy.” See UNEP, Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management: Dubai Declaration 
on International Chemicals Management (2006), http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/agphome/ 
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Similar efforts by actors from different international organizations to jointly 
navigate shared regulatory space are found in other issue areas. For example, 
the ICAO, which sets standards for aviation safety, and the ITU, which 
allocates global radio spectrum and satellite orbits, have collaborated on issues 
of mutual concern, including standards to avoid interference with aeronautical 
communication and navigation systems. These two organizations recently 
started to work on regulatory issues raised by civilian automated pilotless 
aircraft, or drones.29  
Note that in both examples of regulatory cooperation the regulatory 
interactions were initiated by the organizations themselves. In other cases, 
interactions are “rule-based” in the sense that a treaty or other legal instrument 
requires actors from one body to consult with another body whose mission is 
implicated in the first body’s decisionmaking. This article examines below 
examples of such “rule-based” interactions. 
b. Interactions to address collective action problems. Many collective action 
problems are considerably more difficult to solve than the coordination 
problems mentioned above. In these cases, states often face mixed motives, and 
cooperation is therefore harder to maintain. Protecting endangered marine 
species is an example of a collective action problem, and the interactions 
between the FAO and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species (CITES) Secretariat provide an example of how international 
regulatory cooperation can address such problems. 
The FAO seeks to eradicate hunger and food insecurity and promote 
sustainable agriculture. In 1995, the FAO produced a Code of Conduct for 
Responsible Fisheries to address concerns over fisheries management. 
Implementation of FAO norms, however, has historically been weak, and, over 
time, pressures grew to address endangered marine species through other 
mechanisms, including CITES. 
In 2002, several marine species were added to CITES listings.30 However, 
the decision was controversial, given questions about the scope of CITES’s 
jurisdiction over marine species, its expertise, a supposed bias in favor of 
conservation and against economic development, and concerns over creating 
conflicts with FAO norms.31 CITES includes a provision requiring, in 
connection with proposals to list marine species, consultation with “inter-
governmental bodies having a function in relation to those species,”32 and the 
 
documents/Pests_Pesticides/Code/SAICMdeclaration.pdf.  
 29.  See, e.g., ICAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), Cir 328 AN/190 (2011) (noting 
consultations between agencies).   
 30.  See, e.g., Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 
Amendments to Appendices I and II of the Convention, Nov. 15, 2002, 
http://www.cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/cop/12/Adopted_Amendments.pdf.  
 31.  Margaret A. Young, Protecting Endangered Marine Species: Collaboration Between the Food 
and Agriculture Organization and the CITES Regime, 11 MELB. J. INT’L L. 441, 452–59 (2010). 
 32.  Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, art. 
XV(2)(b), March 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087. 
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FAO Code of Conduct encourages states to cooperate in complying with 
treaties that regulate the trade of endangered species.33 Despite significant 
disagreement among FAO members regarding the appropriate relationship 
between FAO and CITES, the two secretariats attempted to formalize their 
interactions, including through lengthy and contentious negotiations over a 
memorandum of understanding.34 These negotiations eventually produced such 
a memorandum providing that CITES is to notify the FAO whenever it 
considers listing a marine species.35 The FAO is thereafter to carry out a 
scientific review of the proposal in accordance with CITES biological listing 
criteria, taking account of any recommendations CITES submits to the FAO.36 
After receiving the FAO review, the memorandum of understanding requires 
the CITES Secretariat to “respect, to the greatest extent possible, the results of 
the FAO [review]” when communicating its recommendations to CITES 
parties.37 
The consultation process has proved highly influential. For example, in 
2007, Germany proposed the listing of two shark species. The CITES 
Secretariat notified the FAO, and an FAO expert panel concluded that the 
available scientific evidence did not support the proposed listing.38 The CITES 
parties did not approve the German proposals.39 In 2013, several proposals to 
list various marine species were submitted to CITES.40 FAO expert panels 
recommended some of these proposals be adopted, including the shark species 
rejected in 2007, and others rejected.41 In each case, the CITES parties followed 
the FAO’s recommendations. Thereafter, the CITES Secretariat and the FAO 
developed a joint plan of action regarding listed species, and delegations from 
the two bodies have begun to collaborate on the implementation of shark 
protection projects. 
 
 33.  FAO,  Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, at art. 11.2.9, 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/v9878e/v9878e00.htm#11 (Oct. 31, 1995).   
 34.  For a detailed account of FAO–CITES negotiations, see Young, supra note 31, at 464–73. 
 35.  See id., at 484 (describing the memorandum of understanding’s process for altering the listing 
of species). 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  FAO & CITES, Memorandum of Understanding Between the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the Secretariat of the Convention on International Trade 
in Endangered Species, at para. 6 [hereinafter FAO–CITES MOU], http://www.cites.org/sites/ 
default/files/eng/disc/sec/FAO-CITES-e.pdf.  
 38.  See FAO, Fisheries Report No. 833: Report of the Second FAO Ad Hoc Expert Advisory 
Panel for the Assessment of Proposals to Amend Appendices I and II of CITES concerning 
Commercially-Exploited Aquatic Species, at 19–28, FIMF/R833 (Mar. 2007) (stating the proposal of 
the porbeagle shark was not supported by available evidence); id. at 37–49 (stating the proposal of the 
spiny dogfish was not supported by available evidence).   
 39.  INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., Summary of the Fourteenth Conference of the Parties to 
the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora: 3–15 June 2007, 
21 EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULLETIN (No. 61) 1, 16 (2007).  
 40.  See, e.g., INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., Summary of the Sixteenth Meeting of the 
Conference of the Parties to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora: 3–14 March 2013, 21 EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULLETIN (No. 83) 1, 23 (2013). 
 41.  Id. 
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Significantly, the CITES Secretariat is not required to accept the 
conclusions of the FAO review. Although the consultation requirement does 
not dictate outcomes, it de facto obliges the CITES Secretariat to engage 
seriously with the FAO’s views and develop a persuasive rationale for pursuing 
an alternative course of action. In practice, CITES listing decisions have largely 
followed the FAO recommendations. 
c. Interactions to address distribution problems. Distribution problems pose 
particularly difficult problems for international law. Given a lack of 
enforcement mechanisms and a general inability to tax and redistribute 
resources, issues with strong distributional features often require other 
mechanisms—such as side payments—or otherwise resist solution. Such is the 
case, for example, with current efforts to craft a climate-change treaty. Perhaps 
not surprisingly, interactions to address distributional problems have met mixed 
success. 
Developments under the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic 
Pollutants (POPs Convention), which bans the use of certain pesticides and 
chemicals, provides a useful illustration of interactions regarding issues with 
strong distributional elements. Perhaps the most controversial issue during the 
POPs negotiations was whether to ban use of the pesticide DDT. A coalition of 
environmental groups advocated for a ban, emphasizing the chemical’s 
potential health effects, including reduced fertility, birth defects, and cancer.42 
On the other hand, many developing states, supported by the WHO (a formal 
participant in the negotiations), argued DDT was highly effective in controlling 
the spread of malaria and that no economically feasible alternative existed.43 In 
effect, the environmental benefits of a ban would impose significant public 
health costs upon developing states. The WHO position ultimately prevailed, 
and the POPs Convention restricts, but does not ban, the continued use of 
DDT.44 
The treaty negotiators contemplated that the list of covered substances 
would change over time.45 In particular, the POPs Convention expressly 
 
 42.  See, e.g., Kathleen R. Walker, et al., Developing an International Consensus on DDT: A 
Balance of Environmental Protection and Disease Control, 206 INT’L J. HYG. ENVIRON. HEALTH 423 
(2003); Erin Perkins, The Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants: A Step Toward the 
Vision of Rachel Carson, 2001 COLO. J. INT’L ENV. L. & POL’Y 191 (2001); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, DDT, 
Target of Global Ban, Finds Defenders in Experts on Malaria, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1999, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/08/29/world/ddt-target-of-global-ban-finds-defenders-in-experts-on-
malaria.html. 
 43.  See, e.g., INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., The Second Session of the International 
Negotiating Committee for an International Legally Binding Instrument for Implementing International 
Action on Certain Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPS): 25–29 January 1999, 15 EARTH 
NEGOTIATIONS BULLETIN (No. 18) 1 (1999) at 2, 4, 9; INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., Report on 
the First Session of the INC for an International Legally Binding Instrument for Implementing 
International Action on Certain Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPS): 29 June–3 July 1998, 15 EARTH 
NEGOTIATIONS BULLETIN (No. 10) 1 (1998), at 6. 
 44.  Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, Annex B, pt. I, May 22, 2001, 40 
I.L.M. 532 (entered into force May 17, 2004). 
 45.  See id., at art. 8 (detailing process for listing new chemicals), art. 16 (detailing process for 
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provides that at least every three years the treaty parties “shall, in consultation 
with the [WHO], evaluate the continued need for DDT for disease vector 
control.”46 The clear expectation is that if and when the WHO determines that 
DDT is no longer needed for malaria control, the treaty will be amended to ban 
DDT. Thus, the treaty explicitly structures an ongoing series of interactions 
between the POPs Secretariat and the WHO over global efforts to regulate 
DDT. 
The POPs Convention also illustrates a much more common form of 
regulatory cooperation; namely, when treaties expressly incorporate by 
reference standards created by another international body. Although the treaty 
does not ban use of DDT, it provides that parties may produce and use DDT 
only in accordance with WHO recommendations and guidelines.47 Thus any 
changes in WHO guidelines expanding or restricting rules for DDT use 
automatically produce changes in the permissible uses of DDT for purposes of 
the POPs Convention. This approach has the effect of generating parallel rules 
in the chemicals and public health regimes, producing harmonized approaches 
to the issue. 
Distributional issues are likewise central to many efforts to regulate 
employment and workplace safety, in which the interests of workers are often in 
tension with those of their employers. For example, issues involving seafarers 
have given rise to much interaction between the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) and the ILO, perhaps in part because of unclear and 
overlapping jurisdictions. The IMO is responsible for the safety and security of 
shipping and the prevention of marine pollution by ships. The ILO promotes 
and realizes international standards related to employment. The two 
organizations have collaborated to establish a series of joint working groups and 
expert groups on issues involving seafarers. These groups produced a variety of 
guidelines,48 which by their terms are not legally binding. Nevertheless, in 
practice, they strongly influence domestic legislation and demonstrate how 
international regulatory cooperation can address international problems with 
strong distributional implications. 
 
evaluating effectiveness of treaty). 
 46.  Id. at Annex B, Part II, para. 6.  
 47.  Id. at Annex B, Part II, para. 2. 
 48.  For a sampling, see IMO & ILO, Code of Practice on Security in Ports, MESSHP/2003/14 
(2003), http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/Instruments/Documents/ILOIMOCodeOfPractice 
English.pdf; IMO, Guidelines on Provision of Financial Security in Case of Abandonment of Seafarers, 
A 22/Res.930 (Dec. 17, 2001) (adopted Nov. 29, 2001), http:// http://www.imo.org/blast/blastDataHelper 
.asp?data_id= 24584& filename=A930(22).pdf; IMO, Guidelines on Shipowners’ Responsibilities in 
Respect to Contractual Claims for Personal Injury to or Death of Seafarers, A 22/Res.931 (Dec. 17, 
2001) (adopted Nov. 29, 2001), http://www.imo.org/blast/blastDataHelper.asp?data_id=24557&filenam 
e=A931(22).pdf;  IMO & ILO, Adoption of Guidelines on Fair Treatment of Seafarers in the Event of a 
Maritime Accident, Res. LEG.3(91), http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Legal/JointIMOILO 
WorkingGroups OnSeafarerIssues/Documents/LEG3(91).pdf (adopted by the IMO Legal Committee 
in April 2006 and the ILO Governing Body in June 2006); IMO & ILO, Guidelines on the Medical 
Examinations of Seafarers (Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_dialogue 
/@sector/documents/normativeinstrument/wcms_174794.pdf.  
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Other times, interactions on issues with strong distributional considerations 
have proven less productive. For example, overfishing threatens many of the 
world’s fisheries, and fisheries subsidies are increasingly seen as promoting 
overfishing. As a result, the WTO, CITES, the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the FAO, and regional fisheries organizations, 
along with numerous other actors, have engaged in intensive interactions over 
WTO negotiating texts on fisheries subsidies.49 These negotiations, however, 
have largely stalled. Still other times, issues with strong distributional 
consequences generate conflict between international bodies, as explained more 
fully in the discussion below of efforts to regulate ship recycling. 
Numerous other examples could be offered, but the general point should be 
clear. Across numerous areas of law and policy, collaborative efforts by officials 
from different international organizations and bodies constitute an important, if 
underappreciated, form of international regulatory cooperation. 
2. Operational Interactions 
International organizations undertake a wide variety of operational 
activities, including high-visibility efforts involving issues of high political 
salience. For example, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons (OPCW) is currently overseeing and verifying the destruction of 
chemical weapons in Syria. Less well publicized is that simultaneously, a wide 
variety of international organizations—including the International Organization 
for Migration (IOM), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the UNHCR, 
the World Food Program (WFP), and the WHO—are partnering to provide 
humanitarian assistance in Syria. The example is illustrative; studies of 
operational activities typically focus on a single body and, to date, have not 
explored how actors from different international bodies interact in the course of 
operational activities.50 
A handful of examples from an array of issue areas provide a sense of the 
scale and range of these operational activities. In the public health field, 
perhaps the best known example is the Joint United Nations Programme on 
HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), a joint venture involving ten cosponsors from a broad 
spectrum of international agencies, including UNHCR, UNICEF, the WFP, 
UNDP, the United Nations Population Fund (UNPF), the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the ILO, UNESCO, the WHO, and the 
World Bank. Although each organization had developed its own AIDS 
program, donor states pressed to consolidate all of these activities under a 
 
 49.  See Olay Schram Stokke & Clare Coffey, Institutional Interplay and Responsible Fisheries: 
Combatting Subsidies, Developing Precaution, in INSTITUTIONAL INTERACTION IN GLOBAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 11, at 127 (discussing institutional interactions). 
 50.  See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: AD HOC MISSIONS, PERMANENT 
ENGAGEMENT (Ramesh Thakur & Albrecht Schnabel, eds. 2001).  
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single, new international organization to minimize duplication and maximize 
the impact of finite resources. Officials at the existing institutions balked, 
triggering “an intricate power struggle between wealthy donor states and the 
international bureaucrats.”51 Perhaps surprisingly, the bureaucrats largely 
prevailed. Through UNAIDS, the agencies with existing programs entered into 
both a partnership and an agreed-upon “division of labour.”52 Through its 
partners, UNAIDS oversees and coordinates a wide variety of operational 
activities, ranging from the distribution of AIDS medications to programs to 
eliminate HIV infections in newborns. 
Similar collaborations are found in virtually every issue area. In the 
environmental domain, the Collaborative Partnership on Forests is an informal 
arrangement among fourteen international organizations with substantial 
programs on forests that collaborate to streamline and coordinate their work.53 
Another example is the Global Environment Facility, which was formed as a 
partnership among UNDP, UNEP, and the World Bank and was designed to 
capitalize on the expertise and comparative advantages of each agency. In the 
trade area, the WTO has joined with the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD), the OECD, the International Trade Center 
(ITC) and a half-dozen other international bodies to assist WTO members in 
implementing their commitments under the recent Trade Facilitation 
Agreement. In addition, the WTO has partnered with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the ITC, UNCTAD, UNDP, and the World Bank to 
create the Enhanced Integrated Framework, which assists least-developed 
states to build trade capacity. In international criminal enforcement, the Green 
Customs Initiative brings together the secretariats of six multilateral 
environmental treaties with officials from Interpol, the OPCW, UNEP, 
UNODC, and the World Customs Organization (WCO) to jointly enhance the 
ability of domestic officials to detect and prevent illegal trade in products 
covered by relevant environmental agreements. In the area of international 
finance, the World Bank, the IMF, and other international financial institutions 
have partnered to reduce debt burdens of developing states through the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries Initiative and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative.54 
 
 51.  Tana Johnson & Johannes Urpelainen, International Bureaucrats and the Formation of 
Intergovernmental Organizations, 68 INT’L ORG. 177, 192 (2014). 
52.   UNAIDS, Summary Division of Labour Guidance Note 2010, http://www.unaids.org/sites/ 
default/files/en/media/unaids/contentassets/documents/document/2011/20110304_DoL_GuidanceNote_
Summary_en.pdf. 
 53.  Members include the Center for International Forestry Research, the Secretariat of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, the FAO, the Global Environment Facility, the International 
Tropical Timber Organization, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), the 
Secretariat of the Convention to Combat Desertification, UNDP, UNEP, the United Nations Forum on 
Forests, the Secretariat of the Framework Convention on Climate Change, the World Agroforestry 
Centre, and the World Bank. 
 54.  See generally IMF, Factsheet: Debt Relief Under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) 
Initiative (Sept. 30, 2014), https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm; IMF, Factsheet: The 
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (Sept. 30, 2014), https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/mdri.htm.  
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Operational interactions even occur in the security domain. For example, in 
2008, an African Union peacekeeping mission in Sudan was replaced by a joint 
African Union–United Nations Hybrid mission in Darfur, which is currently the 
largest peacekeeping mission in the world.55 These forces protect civilians, 
provide security for humanitarian assistance, and monitor and verify the 
implementation of agreements. Their mandate has been extended on several 
occasions. 
In short, inter-regime operational partnerships are increasingly common 
across a range of issues. However, apart from a handful of well-known 
examples, like UNAIDS, these initiatives constitute sites of international 
governance that are hidden in plain sight, and whose significance has been 
understudied and undertheorized. Several aspects of these interactions are of 
particular interest. 
First, operational interactions frequently generate normative standards.56 
Consider, by way of example, UNAIDS. When it was founded, the different 
partner agencies had different procurement policies. Some, like UNICEF, 
emphasized supplier compliance with the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child; others, like UNHCR, had certain preferences for local suppliers; and 
virtually all employed different rules depending on the size of the purchase. 
Collaboration among the agencies required extensive negotiations to 
coordinate the standards applicable to procurement. Similarly, the cosponsoring 
agencies all had their own policies regarding integrity in the use of funds and 
eventually negotiated and adopted a common “zero tolerance” approach to 
corruption in the use of financial resources.57 
Notably, many operational interactions involve efforts to implement and 
enforce international norms—efforts that, in turn, often lead to new norms. The 
ongoing interactions between the WCO and several multilateral environmental 
agreements illustrate this dynamic. The WCO developed and updates the 
Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS). The HS 
comprises over 5,200 commodity groups, each identified by a six-digit code. 
Virtually every state uses the HS “as a basis for their [c]ustoms tariffs and for 
the collection of international trade statistics.”58 
The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 
(Montreal Protocol), controls production and trade in ozone-depleting 
 
55.  For the resolution authorizing this mission, see generally S.C. Res. 1769 (July 31, 2007), 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1769%282007%29. 
 56.  See Ian Johnstone, Law-Making Through the Operational Activities of International 
Organizations, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 87 (2008) (providing an analysis of how operational 
activities by a single international organization can generate normative standards). The dynamics 
Johnstone identifies are only heightened when actors from multiple regimes collaborate. 
 57.  Press Release, UNAIDS, UNAIDS Supports the Global Fund in Efforts to Ensure Countries 
Reach Their Universal Access Goals Towards HIV Prevention, Treatment, Care and Support (Feb. 4, 
2011), http://www.unaids.org/en/resources/presscentre/pressreleaseandstatementarchive/2011/february/ 
20110204psgfatm. 
 58.  WCO, What is the Harmonized System (HS)?, http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/ 
nomenclature/overview/what-is-the-harmonized-system.aspx (last visited Dec. 23, 2014).  
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substances.59 Because many developing states do not produce ozone-depleting 
substances, the success of the treaty turns largely on efforts by customs officials 
to monitor their lawful, and control their unlawful, trade. When the Montreal 
Protocol came into force, however, the collection of import and export data 
proved to be difficult, particularly for many developing states, because the HS 
combined ozone-depleting substances and non-ozone-depleting substances in a 
single category. 
At the request of the Montreal Protocol parties, UNEP’s Executive 
Director asked the WCO to create separate HS codes for ozone-depleting 
substances controlled by the Montreal Protocol.60 Initially, the WCO resisted on 
the grounds that trade in these substances would soon be phased out.61 
Eventually, however, the WCO created new codes,62 which greatly facilitated 
enforcement of the Montreal Protocol. In contrast, the WCO rejected a 
subsequent UNEP request to create HS codes for substances newly controlled 
by the Montreal Protocol on the grounds that the trade impact was too slight to 
warrant separate classification.63 As a compromise, the WCO recommended 
that states amend their customs codes along the lines requested by UNEP.64 
After further communications from UNEP, the WCO Secretariat decided to 
revise—and strengthen—the WCO recommendation. This example 
demonstrates how interactions motivated by enforcement concerns—here, 
enforcement of Montreal Protocol rules—can lead to the production of new 
international norms.65 
3. Conceptual Interactions 
The most intriguing interactions are conceptual. International bodies do not 
simply produce rules and standards; they also create knowledge. They do so by, 
for example, “defin[ing] shared international tasks (like ‘development’), 
creat[ing] and defin[ing] new categories of actors (like ‘refugee’), creat[ing] new 
 
 59.  UNEP, HANDBOOK FOR THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL ON SUBSTANCES THAT DEPLETE THE 
OZONE LAYER (9th ed., 2012), http://ozone.unep.org/Publications/MP_Handbook/MP-Handbook-
2012.pdf.  
 60.  STEPHEN O. ANDERSEN & K. MADHAVA SARMA, PROTECTING THE OZONE LAYER: THE 
UNITED NATIONS HISTORY 277 (Lani Sinclair ed., 2002). See generally U.N. Secretariat, Comm. of 
Experts on the Transp. of Dangerous Goods and on the Globally Harmonized Sys. of Classification and 
Labelling of Chemicals, Subcomm. of Experts on Globally Harmonized Sys. of Classification and 
Labelling of Chemicals, Cooperation with Other International Organizations, ST/SG/AC.10/C.4/2003/3 
(May 2, 2003) (reviewing history or interactions between Montreal Protocol and WCO).  
 61.  UNEP, Report of the Workshop on Codes, Contraband and Cooperation: Working with 
Customs Authorities to Implement Environmental Treaties, ¶ 20, UNEP/(DEC)/WCO/GVA/3 (June 29, 
2001).  
 62.  Andersen & Sarma, supra note 60, at 277. 
 63.  Id.  
 64.  Id.  
 65.  Similar developments have taken place with respect to other MEAs. For example, upon 
request of the CITES Secretariat, the WCO Council has approved the amendment of tariff headings for 
some live animals, meat, and skins controlled by CITES. Similarly, upon request, the HS has also been 
amended from time to time to reflect new subheadings for specific chemicals controlled under the 
Rotterdam Convention and for specific categories of waste controlled by the Basel Convention.  
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interests for actors (like ‘promoting human rights’), and transfer[ing] models of 
organization around the world (like markets and democracy).”66 
Scholarship exploring these issues has tended to focus on developments in 
specific regimes, such as international trade or international humanitarian law.67 
It is time to expand this focus and examine how knowledge production results 
from interactions among, as opposed to within, international legal regimes. 
The WTO has been particularly active on this front. For example, in 2009 
the WTO and UNEP jointly issued a report addressing linkages between trade 
and climate change.68 Issued at a critical point in the ongoing negotiations over a 
post-Kyoto climate change treaty, the report challenges the widespread belief 
that trade rules are in tension with efforts to combat climate change.69 The 
report discusses the WTO-compatibility of border taxes and emissions trading 
systems, two controversial pricing mechanisms that can be used to control 
greenhouse gas emissions.70 Like other joint studies on controversial topics,71 the 
joint WTO–UNEP report does not purport to dispense policy advice. Rather, it 
is explicitly intended to introduce new concepts and shift the debate over the 
relationship between trade and climate change. In the report’s own words, its 
“aim is to promote greater understanding of [the interaction between trade and 
climate change policies] and to assist policymakers in this complex policy 
area.”72 
Another conceptual interaction with potentially far-reaching consequences 
is a joint WTO–OECD initiative that seeks to reconfigure how to measure, if 
not understand, international trade. Trade statistics currently attribute the full 
commercial value of a product to the country of export. Thus, as widely 
reported, when a U.S. buyer imports an iPod from China at a cost of $144,73 
current statistical methods would increase the value of U.S. imports from China 
by $144—even though much of the iPod’s value is licensed from U.S. firms and 
the value-added operations in China total less than four dollars.74 Thus, current 
statistical methods can generate misleading figures on trade balances and 
 
 66.  Michael N. Barnett & Martha Finnemore, The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International 
Organizations, 53 INT’L ORG. 699, 699 (1999).  
 67. See DAVID KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDE OF VIRTUE: REASSESSING INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIANISM (2004) (focusing on international humanitarian law); William J. Drake & Kalypso 
Nicolaidis, Ideas, Interests and Institutionalization: “Trade in Services” and the Uruguay Round, 46 
INT’L ORG. 37 (1992) (focusing on international trade). 
 68.  See UNEP & WTO, Trade and Climate Change, at 47–66 (2009) [hereinafter Climate Report], 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/trade_climate_change_e.pdf. 
 69.  See generally id. 
 70.  Id. at 81 (discussing border taxes); id. at 91–95 (discussing emissions trading schemes). 
 71.  See, e.g., WTO & ILO, Trade and Employment: Challenges for Policy Research (2007), 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/ilo_e.pdf (addressing globalization’s impact on employment 
and wages). 
 72.  Climate Report, supra note 68, at v.  
 73.  Jason Dedrick et al., Who Profits from Innovation in Global Value Chains? A Study of the 
iPod and Notebook PCs, SLOAN INDUSTRY STUDIES ANN. CONF. 16 (2008), 
http://web.mit.edu/is08/pdf/Dedrick_Kraemer_Linden.pdf. 
 74. Id. at 31. 
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thereby distort debates over trade policy. In response, the OECD and the WTO 
are jointly developing new ways to more accurately measure trade flows. Again, 
this initiative is not intended to produce new rules or regulations. Rather, it is 
intended to “help policymakers, academics and the public at large better 
understand trade in the 21st century,”75 in the belief that “better statistics today 
will contribute to better policies tomorrow.”76 
The WTO–UNEP and WTO–OECD collaborations focus on relatively well-
defined topics. Other conceptual interactions address more diffuse issues. 
Consider, for example, the evolving relationship between climate change and 
human rights. For nearly two decades, the climate debate has focused on the 
nature, causes, and consequences of climate change. In recent years, however, 
human rights bodies have initiated a series of conceptual interactions designed 
to change the terms of climate discourse. 
For example, in an address to the Bali Climate Conference in 2007, the UN 
Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights urged the use of a human rights 
perspective when discussing climate issues.77 At roughly the same time, a diverse 
range of international actors, including UNDP and the Organization of 
American States (OAS), began to explore the interface between climate change 
and human rights. In 2008, the Human Rights Council asked the Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights to prepare a “detailed analytical study 
of the relationship between climate change and human rights.”78 In undertaking 
the study, the Office of the High Commissioner opened up a dialogue with a 
variety of other UN bodies, international organizations, national human rights 
institutes, and nongovernmental organizations.79 The study, released in January 
2009, concludes that climate change interferes with a wide range of human 
rights and that states have an obligation under international human rights law 
to protect those rights from the adverse effects of climate change, including in 
particular through international cooperation.80 
The study triggered an extended dialogue on the relationships between the 
two regimes. For example, in 2009 alone, the Special Rapporteur on adequate 
housing issued a report on the impact of climate change on the right to 
 
 75.  WTO, Annual Report 2013, 130 (2013), http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e 
/anrep13_e.pdf. 
 76.  Pascal Lamy, Director-General, WTO, Address at the OECD:  “New Steps in Measuring 
Trade in Value Added” (Jan. 16, 2013) (transcript available at http://www.wto.org/ 
english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl261_e.htm).  
 77.  Kyung-wha Kang, Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights, UNHCR, Address to 
Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and its 
Kyoto Protocol: Climate Change and Human Rights (Dec. 3–14, 2007) (transcript available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=200&LangID=E). 
 78.  HRC, Annual Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the 
Reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General: Report of the Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Relationship Between Climate Change and Human Rights, 
10th Sess., ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/61 (Jan. 15, 2009). 
 79.  See id. ¶ 2 (noting the comments and input from various organizations). 
 80.  Id. ¶ 92–99. 
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adequate housing, the Representative of the Secretary General on the human 
rights of internally displaced people issued a report on the nexus between 
climate change and internal displacement, and twenty Special Procedures 
mandate holders issued a joint statement to encourage the inclusion of human 
rights in the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference.81 More recently, the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights appointed an 
Independent Expert on Human Rights and the Environment.82 
The purpose of these initiatives is, in the words of a prominent human rights 
advocate, to transform “how climate change is perceived.” 83 To date, climate 
change “has been viewed as a scientific projection, ‘a kind of line graph 
stretching into the future with abstract measurements based on parts per 
million, degrees centigrade or centimetres.’”84 But the introduction of “human 
rights thinking” is intended to change this conceptualization by “supplying a set 
of internationally agreed values around which policy responses can be 
negotiated and motivated” and hence “contribute, qualitatively, to the 
construction of better policy responses at both the national and international 
level.”85 In short, actors in the human rights community have provoked an 
ongoing set of conceptual interactions intended to change social understandings 
of climate change, the problems it poses, and the range of appropriate 
responses to it. 
B. Nature of International Regulatory Interactions 
In addition to distinguishing various forms of regulatory cooperation, it is 
useful to categorize the nature of these interactions. For current purposes, 
international regulatory interactions can be characterized as focused on the 
“rationalization” of rules or operations, on the “expansion” of jurisdiction or 
authority, or as involving political and legal “conflict” between two or more 
bodies. Notably, interactions are quite fluid and these categories are highly 
permeable; as any particular interaction proceeds, it may migrate from one 
category to another. 
1. Rationalization Interactions 
As noted above, many operational interactions are triggered by the practical 
reality that multiple international bodies often exercise concurrent jurisdiction 
over the same set of individuals or activities and are designed to rationalize 
these efforts. UNAIDS is a representative example. By the early 1990s, a 
 
 81.  Joint Statement of the Special Procedure Mandate Holders of the Human Rights Council on the 
UN Climate Change Conference (Dec. 7, 2009), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/ 
DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=9667&LangID=E.  
 82.  Human Rights Council Res. 19/10, Human Rights and the Environment, 19th Sess., U.N. Doc 
A/HRC/RES/19/10, at 2–3 (Apr. 19, 2012). 
 83.  Marc Limon, Human Rights and Climate Change: Constructing a Case for Political Action, 33 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 439, 451 (2009) (citation omitted). 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. at 451–52. 
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number of international organizations had developed AIDs programs. Donors 
soon complained that a lack of coordination among UN agencies resulted in 
duplicative efforts and turf battles, which lessened the effectiveness of the 
global fight against AIDS.86 Thus, the original motivation behind UNAIDS was 
the desire to streamline disparate yet overlapping efforts and to address policy 
gaps. One notable accomplishment of UNAIDS was the development of a 
detailed “division of labour” among the partner agencies. 
Similar dynamics can be seen in the area of humanitarian aid. Due to the ad 
hoc and unpredictable nature of emergencies, international responses were 
traditionally highly disorganized. In 2005, the United Nations Emergency 
Response Coordinator introduced an Agenda for Reform, which eventually led 
to the formation of groups of organizations organized by “cluster.”87 The WFP, 
the world’s largest humanitarian agency, is designated lead agency of the 
“logistics cluster,” meaning it is responsible for coordination, information 
management, and, when necessary, logistics service provision to ensure effective 
and efficient operational logistics.88 In this role, the WFP is working with the 
WHO, the IOM, and other international organizations in Syria and has 
facilitated cargo operations on behalf of thirty-two different international 
organizations in the Philippines in the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan.89 
As this example suggests, relief operations frequently give rise to complex 
cooperation issues. For example, the WFP has developed a complex set of 
policies, guidelines, and standards for its emergency field operations, as have 
other international organizations such as UNHCR, UNICEF, and the FAO.90 
When two or more of these organizations collaborate in joint activities, it 
becomes necessary to address differences in rules and standards. Often, the 
agencies do so through procedural approaches, such as identifying one agency 
as the lead actor in a certain area. For example, when the WFP works with 
UNHCR, UNHCR is generally responsible for distribution;91 in contrast, when 
the WFP works with UNICEF, the WFP is generally responsible for 
distribution.92 These agreed-upon divisions of labor are often memorialized in 
 
 86.  LINDSAY KNIGHT, UNAIDS: THE FIRST TEN YEARS 20 (2008), 
http://data.unaids.org/pub/report/2008/jc1579_first_10_years_en.pdf.  
 87.  See Cluster Coordination, UN OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN 
AFFAIRS, http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/coordination-tools/cluster-coordination (last visited Mar. 
10, 2015); About the Logistics Cluster, LOGISTICS CLUSTER, http://www.logcluster.org/logistics-cluster 
(last visited Mar. 10, 2015). 
 88.  Our Work, WFP, http://www.wfp.org/logistics (last visited Mar. 10, 2015). 
 89.  See WFP, The Year after the Storm: The WFP Haiyan Report 24 (Nov. 2014), 
http://fi.wfp.org/sites/default/files/fi/file/a_year_after_the_storm_-_the_wfp_haiyan_report.pdf; see 
generally WFP & LOGISTICS CLUSTER, Syria Response May 2014 Report, 
http://www.logcluster.org/sites/default/files/logistics_cluster_syria_monthly_report_may_140612.pdf . 
 90.  See, e.g., WFP, EMERGENCY FIELD OPERATIONS POCKETBOOK (2002), http://www.unicef.org 
/emerg/files/WFP_manual.pdf. 
 91.  Id. at 243–44. 
 92.  Id. at 248–49. 
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agreements negotiated by the relevant secretariats.93 
Rationalization logics are also prominent in many regulatory interactions. 
For example, both CITES and the FAO asserted authority to protect 
endangered marine species. Numerous states expressed concern that, absent 
coordination, the risk of inconsistent norms was unacceptably high, and many 
FAO members asserted that the FAO should have a veto over CITES listing 
decisions. Thereafter, officials from the two agencies negotiated an agreement 
clarifying how responsibilities for deciding which species should be protected 
would be divided between the two agencies.94 
Rationalization logics are found in conceptual interactions as well. For 
example, the WTO–UNEP report on trade and climate devotes significant 
attention to strengthening cooperation between “the trade and climate change 
regimes . . . in a mutually supportive manner, within their respective spheres of 
competence.”95 Notably, international bodies do not invariably seek to expand 
their mandates. For example, in the trade–climate context, the WTO Director-
General argued that the trade issues raised by efforts to combat climate change 
were better addressed within the climate regime than by the WTO.96 
2. Expansion Interactions 
Some interactions provide opportunities for international bodies to expand 
their regulatory footprint. For example, the POPs–WHO interactions provide 
public health officials direct and ongoing influence in the chemicals regime. 
Given the structure of the POPs Convention, decisions made by the WHO, on 
the basis of international public health norms, will lead to changes in an 
environmental treaty’s rules governing the use of dangerous chemicals. 
Similar dynamics can be seen on the operational side. Consider ongoing 
interactions between the United Nations Relief and World Agency (UNRWA) 
and UNHCR. UNRWA was created to provide humanitarian relief to refugees 
and displaced persons forced to flee the British Mandate for Palestine as a 
result of the 1948 Arab–Israeli war.97 When founded, UNRWA’s geographic 
ambit was limited to Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the Gaza Strip, and the West 
Bank.98 UNHCR’s geographic ambit is worldwide; however, its statute provides 
its competence shall not extend to a person “[w]ho continues to receive from 
other organs or agencies of the United Nations protection or assistance.”99 
 
 93.  See, e.g., UNHCR & WFP, Memorandum of Understanding between the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food Programme (WFP) (July 1, 
2002),  http://www.refworld.org/docid/3d357f502.html. 
 94.  See FAO-CITES MOU, supra note 37. 
 95.  Climate Report, supra note 68, at 83. 
 96.  Pascal Lamy, Director-General, WTO, Speech at the Informal Trade Ministers’ Dialogue on 
Climate Change: Doha Could Deliver Double-win for Environment and Trade (Dec. 9, 2007), 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl83_e.htm.  
 97.  G.A. Res. 302 (IV), ¶ 5–7, U.N. Doc. A/RES/302 (IV) (Dec. 8, 1949). 
 98.  UNRWA & UNHCR, THE UNITED NATIONS AND PALESTINIAN REFUGEES, at 4 (2007) 
[hereinafter PALESTINIAN REFUGEES], http://www.unrwa.org/userfiles/2010011791015.pdf. 
 99.  Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, G.A. Res. 428 
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These provisions raise questions as to whether and when Palestinian refugees 
fall within UNHCR’s mandate.100 
Despite apparent textual limitations, over time, UNRWA and UNHCR 
have increasingly collaborated in ways that push the boundaries of their 
respective mandates. Examples include joint activities after Libya expelled 
Palestinians in 1995 and, more recently, in the aftermath of attacks on 
Palestinians in Iraq, when UNRWA and UNHCR coordinated on the provision 
of assistance.101 Moreover, in recent years, UNRWA and UNHCR have acted in 
coordination to provide assistance to Palestinian refugees in Jordan and Syria.102 
Through these joint activities, UNRWA has acted in areas arguably outside its 
geographic mandate, and UNHCR has been active on behalf of individuals who 
arguably fall outside of its mandate. Although the various operational 
interactions between UNRWA and UNHCR have historically had a strongly ad 
hoc nature, in 2010, the two organizations established a joint expert working 
group to address issues related to the overlapping legal regimes in this area.103 
Finally, conceptual interactions often lead international actors into areas 
traditionally considered outside their ambit. The efforts by the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights to engage with officials from the climate 
regime is one prominent example of an international actor moving into areas 
not traditionally considered near the core of his expertise. A more recent 
example is a joint study prepared by the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO), the WTO, and the WHO on “Promoting Access to 
Medical Technologies: Intersections between Public Health, Intellectual 
Property and Trade.”104 Like other conceptual interactions discussed above, it 
does not prescribe how to address particular public health problems, but rather, 
it examines how to tailor systems to encourage innovation and ensure 
sustainable and equitable access to innovations. Notably, the focus on 
innovation, accessibility, and trade pulls each of the three partners outside of its 
core areas of expertise. 
3. Conflictual Interactions 
Not surprisingly, interactions among international bodies are not always 
cooperative. By way of example, consider recent efforts to address 
shipbreaking. This practice poses a number of environmental risks. It is heavily 
regulated in developed states, but regulation is substantially less stringent in 
 
(V), Annex, ¶ 7, pt. c (Dec. 14, 1950).  
 100.  UNHCR, Revised Note on the Applicability of Article 1D of the 1951 Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees to Palestinian Refugees, (Oct. 2009),  http://www.refworld.org/docid/4add77d42.html . 
 101.  Noura Erakat, Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Uprising: Filling the Protection Gap during 
Secondary Forced Displacement, 26 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 581(2014).  
 102.  PALESTINIAN REFUGEES, supra note 98, at 12. 
 103.  Erakat, supra note 101, at 595. 
 104.  WHO, WIPO & WTO, Promoting Access to Medical Technologies and Innovation: 
Intersections between Public Health, Intellectual Property and Trade (2012), http://www.wto.org/ 
english/res_e/booksp_e/pamtiwhowipowtoweb13_e.pdf. 
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many developing states.105 A number of international legal instruments—all 
adopted within months of each other—address this activity, including IMO 
Guidelines on Ship Recycling;106 ILO Guidelines on Safety and Health in 
Shipbreaking;107 and Technical Guidelines for the Environmentally Sound 
Management of the Full and Partial Dismantling of Ships, adopted by the 
Conference of Parties to the Basel Convention.108 This highly fragmented 
approach quickly raised concerns over regulatory gaps, overlaps, and potential 
inconsistencies. Therefore, the IMO, ILO, and Basel Secretariats formed a joint 
working group to study the relationship among the various instruments.109 The 
three bodies agreed to collaborate on the drafting of a new treaty to be 
concluded under IMO auspices. 
Thereafter, the three organizations—along with other key actors, including 
major shipping states like Norway—became deeply involved in negotiating and 
drafting what eventually became the Hong Kong International Convention for 
the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships.110 The Hong Kong 
Convention, adopted in 2009, clearly shows the results of interagency 
cooperation; it expressly incorporates principles set forth in instruments 
prepared by the three institutions, and its annex creates a process of continuing 
interactions among the three agencies in the promulgation of regulations under 
the treaty.111 Although the treaty has not yet entered into force, the ILO and 
 
 
 105.  See generally Tony George Puthucherril, From Shipbreaking to Sustainable Ship Recycling: 
Evolution of a Legal Regime, in 5 LEGAL ASPECTS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, 26–51 (David 
Freestone ed., 2010) (detailing the differences in shipbreaking regulations in developed nations as 
compared to developing nations). 
 106.  IMO, Assemb. Res. A.962(23), A 23/Res.962 (Mar. 4, 2004) (amended by IMO, Assemb. Res. 
A.980(24), A 24/Res.980 (Feb. 3, 2006)).  
 107.  ILO, Safety and Health in Shipbreaking: Guidelines for Asian Countries and Turkey, 
MESHS/2003/1 (Oct. 7–14, 2003). 
 108.  Conference of Parties to the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements 
of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, Decision VI/24  (2012) (adopting the Technical Guidelines for 
the Environmentally Sound Management of the Full and Partial Dismantling of Ships). 
 109.  See Joint ILO–IMO–BC Working Group on Ship Scrapping, 1st Sess., Feb. 15–17, 2005, Report 
of the First Session of the Joint Working Group on Ship Scrapping, at ¶ 3.8, Doc. ILO/IMO/BC WG 1/8 
(Feb. 18, 2005) (acknowledging the conflict between the IMO Guidelines and the Basel Convention 
guidelines). 
 110.  Specifically, representatives of the IMO, Basel Convention, and ILO participated in three joint 
meetings between 2005 and 2008 of the Working Group on Ship Scrapping. Joint ILO/IMO/BC 
Working Group on Ship Scrapping, Report of the Working Group, 1st Sess., Feb. 15–17, 2005,  
ILO/IMO/BC WG 1/8 (Feb. 18, 2005); Joint ILO/IMO/BC Working Group on Ship Scrapping, Report 
of the Joint Working Group, 2nd Sess., Dec. 12–14, 2005, ILO/IMO/BC WG 2/11 (Dec. 14, 2005); Joint 
ILO/IMO/BC Working Group on Ship Scrapping, Final Report, 3rd Sess., Oct. 29–31, 2008, 
ILO/IMO/BC WG 3/6 (Oct. 31, 2008). Resolution 2 adopted at the conclusion of the 2009 International 
Conference for the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships acknowledged the contribution 
of the ILO and the Basel Convention to the development of the Convention. See Recycling of Ships: 
The Development of the Hong Kong Convention, IMO, http://www.imo.org/ourwork/environment 
/shiprecycling (last visited Mar. 10, 2015). 
 111.  IMO, International Conference on the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships, 
IMO Doc. SR/CONF/45 (May 19, 2009) (not in force) (opened for signature Sept. 1, 2009).  
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Basel Secretariats have been involved in the development of draft regulations 
under the treaty. 
The Hong Kong Convention, however, has also given rise to controversy. In 
particular, critics claim it is weaker than the Basel Convention in several 
respects.112 Against this backdrop, the Basel Convention parties formally 
examined whether the Hong Kong Convention provides “an equivalent level of 
control and enforcement as that established under the Basel Convention.”113 An 
Open Ended Working Group provided an assessment to the Conference of the 
Parties,114 which debated the issue at an October 2011 meeting. The discussion 
revealed a sharp split among Basel parties and, despite extensive dialogue, 
consensus could not be reached. The Conference of the Parties adopted a 
decision explicitly noting this ongoing disagreement.115 The decision also 
encouraged states to ratify the Hong Kong Convention, suggesting equivalence, 
but at the same time acknowledged that the Basel Convention Secretariat 
should continue to assist countries in applying the Basel Convention as it relates 
to ships, suggesting a lack of equivalence.116 The unresolved debate over 
whether the Hong Kong Convention supports or undermines the Basel 
Convention has likely contributed to the very low number of ratifications—
currently, three.117 
In another example, after a high-profile oil spill off the Spanish coast, a 
number of nongovernmental organizations lobbied the UN Secretary General 
to organize a process to discuss improving implementation of maritime safety 
standards. In response, in 2003 the Secretary General convened a Consultative 
Group on Flag State Implementation, including officials from the IMO, the 
ILO, the FAO, UNEP, UNCTAD, and the OECD.118 Substantial differences of 
 
 112.  Critics note that the Basel Convention covers a broader range of ships and recycling facilities, 
and also that the Basel Convention’s technical guidelines rejects “beaching” as a dismantlement 
method, whereas the dismantlement question is open under the Hong Kong Convention—at least until 
the IMO adopts guidelines. For an analysis of these, and other differences, see Communication from 
the European Commission to the Council, COM (2010) 88 final (Dec. 3, 2010). 
 113.  UNEP, Report of the Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention on the Control of 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal on its Ninth Meeting, June 23–27, 
2008, at Dec. IX/30, pt. I, UNUNEP/CHW.9/39 (June 27, 2008). 
 114.  UNEP, Open-ended Working Group of the Basel Convention on the Control of 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, Cooperation between the Basel 
Convention and the International Maritime Organization, UNEP/CHW/OEWG/7/12 (Apr. 14, 2010). 
 115.  Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Cartagena, Columbia, Oct. 17–21, 2011, Report 
of the Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements 
of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal on its Tenth Meeting, UNEP/CHW.10/28, at para. 130–35 
(Nov. 1, 2011). 
 116.  Id. at Annex I, BC-10/17, para. 2–3. The decision also underscored the importance of 
continued cooperation between the ILO, IMO, and the Basel Convention on the issue of ship recycling. 
Id. at para. 129. 
 117.  IMO, Status of Multilateral Conventions and Instruments in Respect of Which the 
International Maritime Organization or its Secretary-General Performs Depositary or Other Functions 
509 (Mar. 10, 2015). 
 118.  See G.A. Res. 57/141, ¶ 73, U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/141 (Feb. 21, 2003) (requesting the Secretary-
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opinion quickly emerged. The IMO observed that, with respect to flag state 
implementation of safety and antipollution standards, “[t]he role of the IMO in 
this regard should be seen as pre-eminent.”119 In a letter to the UN Secretary 
General, the IMO’s Secretary General tartly observed that issues related to 
state compliance with “IMO Conventions and regulations are not subjects 
which need additional coordination at inter-agency meetings,” and that the 
“IMO does not see the need for any further meetings of the inter-agency 
Consultative Group.”120 
Operational interactions can likewise be conflictual. As noted above, the 
impetus for various UNAIDs partners to work together came from donor states 
and not from the agencies themselves. The different international agencies, 
however, had very different ideas of how best to address the AIDS epidemic; 
early efforts to collaborate sparked intense debates about how to prioritize and 
allocate resources.121 
C. The Multi-dimensional Nature of International Regulatory Cooperation 
For those unfamiliar with the interactions described above, the highly 
compressed descriptions might seem a blur of acronyms. To summarize this 
material graphically, the two axes discussed above are juxtaposed to create a 
three-by-three matrix in table 1 below. The matrix provides a synoptic overview 
of different modes of international regulatory cooperation between and among 
international organizations. At the same time, it highlights the multidimensional 















General provide a report “on the implementation of the present resolution”); U.N. Secretary-General, 
Oceans and the Law of the Sea, at para. 85–91, U.N. Doc. A/58/65 (Mar. 3, 2003) (discussing “[f]lag 
state implementation and enforcement”).  
 119.  U.N. Secretary-General, Oceans and the Law of the Sea, ¶ 12,U.N. Doc. A/59/63 (Mar. 5, 
2004). 
 120.  Id. at Annex III. 
 121.  See, e.g., TANA JOHNSON, ORGANIZATIONAL PROGENY: WHY GOVERNMENTS ARE LOSING 
CONTROL OVER THE PROLIFERATING STRUCTURES OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (2014). 
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AN AGENDA FOR FUTURE RESEARCH ON INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY 
COOPERATION 
Regulatory cooperation involving actors from different international 
organizations and regimes occurs across a wide variety of issue areas and 
operates across the full spectrum of lawmaking, implementation, and 
enforcement. A primary goal of this article is to provide analytic tools to clarify 
systematically the different modes of interaction leading to regulatory 
cooperation. This analysis, however, immediately raises challenging questions 
regarding the empirical determinants and the normative implications of this 
activity. Although a thorough analysis of these issues is well beyond the scope 
of this article, it is useful to identify topics that future scholarship might address, 
including a number of empirical and descriptive research projects that would 
substantially advance our understanding of the factors that drive interactions 
among international organizations. In addition, this section identifies normative 
concerns raised by international regulatory cooperation, including issues of 
accountability, legitimacy, and power. Both individually and together, these 
lines of inquiry suggest the outlines of a research agenda intended to 
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substantially advance our understanding of international regulatory 
cooperation. 
A. Positive Inquiry into International Regulatory Cooperation 
The typology set out in part III highlights variation in the form and purpose 
of international regulatory cooperation. This variation invites inquiry into the 
factors driving or shaping the interactions among international bodies, including 
relevant actors, the nature of the underlying cooperation problem structure, 
substantive issue areas, and change over time. 
1. Who Are the Relevant Actors? 
The examples set out above demonstrate that interactions occur among 
actors found in a range of issue areas. It would be useful to investigate how 
structural relationships between the relevant actors shape interactions. For 
example, are there systematic differences in regulatory outcomes depending on 
whether the interacting entities (1) are located within “nested regimes,” such as 
actors from the WTO and a regional trade body; (2) are from “parallel 
regimes,” such as actors from two of the international financial institutions; or 
(3) are from “unrelated regimes,” such as actors from an international trade 
body and an international labor body? Another line of inquiry might explore 
whether an increase in the number of relevant actors makes cooperation more 
difficult, as more interests need to be satisfied, or easier, as the set of mutually 
beneficial tradeoffs expands. 
2. Problem Structure 
The examples in part III reveal that international regulatory efforts address 
a wide variety of international problems including coordination, cooperation, 
distribution, and enforcement problems. Just as problem structure helps explain 
the design and functioning of individual international organizations,122 problem 
structure might help explain the nature and form of interactions among 
international organizations. For example, do distributional problems more 
frequently lead to conflictual interactions than enforcement problems? Do 
coordination problems lend themselves more easily to operational interactions, 
because parties have little reason to defect? 
3. Issue Area 
The international system is marked by uneven legalization and 
institutionalization across issue areas. For example, regulatory regimes in the 
economic realm are more numerous and more legalized than they are in the 
security realm. And in the economic domain, both institutionalization and 
legalization are much higher in the area of trade than in finance. The highly 
variable distribution of international regulatory bodies suggests that efforts at 
 
 122.  Barbara Koremenos et al., The Rational Design of International Institutions, 55 INT’L ORG. 761 
(2001). 
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international regulatory cooperation will be both more common and more 
frequently successful in some issue areas than in others, and identifying these 
patterns would enhance our understanding of both the possibilities and limits of 
regulatory cooperation. 
4. Sequencing and Change over Time 
The survey in part III emphasizes that interactions are often fluid and 
dynamic. Thus, the interactions among the ILO, IMO, and Basel Secretariats 
concerning the Hong Kong Convention shifted over time from cooperative to 
conflictual;123 the interactions among the six international organizations 
involved in the creation of UNAIDS evolved from cooperative to conflictual to 
cooperative;124 and the regulatory interactions between UNEP and the WCO 
have vacillated between cooperative and conflictual.125 The variation over time 
invites inquiry into why some interactions are relatively stable while others 
migrate along either of the axes identified in part III. The variation also invites 
inquiry into the features that push interactions towards or away from 
cooperative outcomes. 
B. Normative Analysis of International Regulatory Cooperation 
A complementary set of inquiries could examine the normative implications 
of international regulatory cooperation. Specifically, future research could 
explore whether the normative critiques lodged against traditional forms of 
international lawmaking are equally applicable to international regulatory 
cooperation. For example, some critics note that international processes are 
insufficiently transparent, increasingly detached from popular or representative 
politics, and are no longer sufficiently rooted in state consent.126 Others claim 
that international law systematically privileges the interests of powerful states 
and well-organized political actors and gives lesser regard to more weakly 
organized and less powerful groups and vulnerable individuals.127 These and 
related critiques lead to frequent claims that much international law is 
unaccountable and illegitimate. These critiques arguably apply with greater 
force to the phenomena of international bodies and secretariats initiating 
international regulatory interactions and also developing new international 
norms, often without explicit state consent. 
For current purposes, a few lines of argument can be outlined and several 
research inquiries identified. First, many of the interactions outlined above are 
designed to permit international organizations to achieve their objectives more 
 
 123.  See supra, Part III.B.3. 
 124.  See supra, Part III A.1.c. & Part III.B.1.  
 125.  See supra, Part III.A.2.  
 126.  For analyses of the various critiques of international law, see, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & 
ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005); JENS DAVID OHLIN, THE ASSAULT 
ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (2015); STEVEN WHEATLEY, THE DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010). 
 127.  Stewart, supra note 20, at 211. 
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effectively. For example, when the WTO collaborates with other organizations 
to help poorer states participate more fully in the international trade system, 
these efforts are intended to promote the WTO’s trade liberalization objectives. 
Those who object to these objectives would likely find the WTO’s interactions 
with other bodies similarly problematic. In cases like this, positions on the 
normative desirability of regulatory cooperation will be derivative of normative 
positions regarding the goals of the underlying legal regimes, raising issues well 
beyond the scope of this symposium. 
More importantly, whether interactions among different international 
organizations reduce or enhance international law’s supposed deficiencies and 
whether they entrench, or challenge, powerful actors and interests should be 
treated as open questions that require analysis rather than assertions. Consider, 
for example, the IMO–ILO interactions producing norms on the safety of 
seafarers. Prior to these interactions, the IMO had long been active on maritime 
safety issues. IMO instruments, were traditionally “not [driven by] concern for 
the lives of sailors, slaves, or emigrants, but concern for the security of maritime 
investment.”128 Shifting from an IMO to a joint IMO–ILO process might 
plausibly be viewed as adding an institutional voice that represents a previously 
underrepresented set of interests directly impacted by global maritime safety 
norms. Claims along these lines, in turn, invite inquiry into whether the 
interactive process between the IMO and ILO is more or less subject to 
“capture” than IMO processes—as well as inquiry into whether entities that 
represent other arguably relevant interests, such as environmental or human 
rights bodies, adequately participated in these regulatory interactions. For 
current purposes, the point is not to resolve whether the IMO–ILO interactions 
were sufficiently inclusive, but rather to suggest that normative evaluation of 
international regulatory cooperation should proceed on the basis of highly 
detailed accounts of specific interactions, accounts that have not yet been 
developed. 
Thus, international regulatory cooperation offers a rich research agenda to 
those troubled by international law’s supposed legitimacy and accountability 
deficits. Here, the discussion is limited to a few conceptual points and 
possibilities regarding these issues. When two international bodies collaborate 
on issues of mutual concern, their interactions effectively reaffirm the stature 
and legitimacy of each agency to operate in the area under consideration. Thus, 
joint IMO–ILO efforts on maritime safety reinforce claims that this issue 
comfortably falls within each body’s jurisdiction. 
Other times, interactions can challenge or undermine the legitimacy of 
claims to authority in particular domains. For example, unsuccessful efforts to 
collaborate, or exclusion of a particular body from an international partnership, 
can signal substantial concerns over whether the agency is a legitimate 
participant in a particular policy domain. Hence, the IMO’s sharp rejection of 
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efforts to create a multiagency consortium to discuss flag-state implementation 
of maritime safety standards can be seen as a challenge to the legitimacy of 
other organizations’ involvement in these issues. This interaction can be 
usefully contrasted with the conflictual interactions related to the Hong Kong 
Convention. In that case, the Basel Secretariat’s concern over the treaty’s 
environmental stringency did not reflect concerns over the legitimacy of IMO 
and ILO participation in this policy area, but rather over the substantive merits 
of competing policy approaches. 
To be sure, those who critique international organizations’ lack of 
accountability might suggest that regulation via interactions between two or 
more of these bodies simply compounds the problem. But this claim would need 
to address some salient features of regulatory interactions among international 
organizations. For example, virtually every exchange among two or more 
international bodies de facto calls for a reasoned elaboration for or against a 
proposed action, with each body reviewing the positions and activities of the 
other. Thus, for example, structured dialogues between the WHO and the POPs 
Secretariat over whether and how to regulate dangerous chemicals, between the 
FAO and CITES over whether an appropriate scientific basis exists to list a 
marine species as endangered, and between the ICAO and the ITU over how 
best to protect air navigation systems can be seen as introducing requirements 
of reasoned decisionmaking and review mechanisms in areas where they might 
otherwise be lacking. 
Finally, future research can do much to illuminate the power dynamics that 
motivate efforts at international regulatory cooperation and shape their 
outcomes. Do international organizations led by powerful states or economic 
interests dominate or crowd out “weaker” international bodies? Do regulatory 
interactions operate to give voice to those typically marginalized by 
international processes, and if so, under what conditions? There is likely no 
“global” answer to these questions—international regulatory efforts come in 
too many varieties and in too many different contexts to permit broad 
generalizations. But a few observations might help inform future inquiries in 
these areas. 
One observation is that “stronger” international organizations do not 
invariably use interactions to expand their jurisdiction or to impose their views 
on “weaker” organizations. For example, as noted above, a joint report by the 
WTO and UNEP defended the use of certain trade instruments to address 
climate change and the WTO deferred to the climate regime on technology 
transfer issues.129 So the relevant question is whether interactions like these 
serve to entrench asymmetries or create avenues for change. 
Perhaps more importantly, studying international regulatory cooperation 
can serve as a reminder that power in international affairs comes in many 
 
 129.  See supra Part III.A.3.  
DUNOFF_FINAL_1-14 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/14/2016  1:25 PM 
298 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 78:267 
varieties.130 To be sure, international regulatory efforts provide ample examples 
of “power as influence”—in which more powerful international bodies, or 
bodies dominated by more powerful actors, are able to influence the timing and 
content of regulatory outcomes. But other forms of power are on display in 
international regulatory interactions as well. For example, some unsuccessful 
efforts at international regulatory cooperation illustrate what one might call 
“power as autonomy,”131 which is the ability to exercise policy independence 
free of the pressures or constraints imposed by other international actors. The 
IMO’s rejection of collaboration with other international bodies, 
notwithstanding efforts by the UN Secretary General and others to forge a 
collaborative partnership, is but one example of how power as autonomy 
manifests in the context of international regulatory efforts. Moreover, 
international regulatory efforts often involve “discursive power,” that is, “the 
social processes and the systems of knowledge through which meaning is 
produced, fixed, lived, experienced, and transformed.”132 Conceptual 
interactions, such as the interactions between the human rights and climate 
change communities, are the most prominent examples of the working of 
discursive power, as they are centrally concerned with the contestation and 
production of social meaning. But the iterative dialogic interactions that mark 
other forms of regulatory interaction—such as the exchanges between UNEP 
and the WCO over ozone-depleting substances and between the ICAO and the 
ITU over aircraft communication systems—can likewise be approached as 
opportunities to study the workings of discursive power. 
In short, co-governance by actors from different international regimes gives 
rise to new sites of power, where the issue is less the autonomy of any particular 
international organization than it is the various forms of cooperative and 
uncooperative relationships that emerge from ongoing interactions between 
officials from different regimes.  Thus, too sharp a focus on whether “weaker” 
regimes gain or lose from regulatory cooperation risks valorizing one form of 
power while ignoring others that are more fluid, contingent, and contested. 
As should be clear, although international regulatory cooperation holds 
much promise, there is no reason to think that every instance of institutional 
interaction is necessarily benign, or that the pathologies that mark some 
international governance disappear through interaction. One goal of future 
research should be to identify the factors that lead to interactions that reduce, 
rather than strengthen, deficiencies in international lawmaking. Future inquiries 
can explore when interactions favor well-organized interests that have the 
resources and expertise to participate effectively in inter-institutional 
 
 130.  See generally POWER IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Michael Barnett & Raymond Duvall eds., 
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 131.  This phrase comes from Benjamin J. Cohen, The Macrofoundations of Monetary Power, in 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY POWER 31, 32 (David M. Andrews ed., 2006). 
 132.  Michael Barnett & Raymond Duvall, Power in International Politics, 59 INT’L. ORG. 39, 55 
(2005). 
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interactions and when they empower those left out of traditional processes. 
Future scholarship can explore questions such as under what circumstances do 
interactions permit international organizations to pursue their own institutional 
agendas and when do such interactions promote advancement of broader public 
interests? When will interactions expand the domain of international politics 
and contestation—and when will they offer technocratic expertise in their 
place? These questions are hardly exhaustive. But they do suggest that there is 
fertile ground for future research, both theoretical and empirical, on 




The central goals of this article are to illustrate a largely hidden landscape of 
international regulatory cooperation, to raise issues for further analysis and 
development, and thereby to demonstrate the value of sustained study of this 
activity. The survey presented above reveals that the terrain of international 
regulatory cooperation is highly variegated, yet it consists of a dense network of 
collaboration increasingly important to the management of contemporary 
international affairs. Understanding the nature and quality of these 
relationships is essential to understanding the range and the reach—the 
possibilities and the limits—of modern international regulatory cooperation. 
 
